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Summary 
The choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime has been a subject of ongoing debate in 
international economics. The majority of African countries are small open economies and thus where 
the choice of the exchange rate regime is an important policy issue. Aside from factors such as 
interest rates and inflation, the exchange rate is one of the most important determinants of a 
country’s relative level of economic health. For this reason, exchange rates are among the most 
watched analyzed and governmentally manipulated economic variables. 
This paper revisits the debate on the choice of an appropriate exchange-rate regime for African 
countries. It starts by reviewing literature on the debate of appropriate exchange rate regimes. It then 
discusses relevant considerations for the choice of the exchange rate regimes for African countries. 
The debate revolves around the effect of exchange rate on macroeconomic management, particularly 
inflation and export competitiveness. The paper recommends the conventional peg arrangement as a 
viable option for the majority of low-income African countries. But this is contingent on a number of 
important pre-conditions. For middle-income African economies, with relatively developed financial 
markets and linkages to modern global capital markets, floating arrangements, including the 
managed floating exchange rate regime, look more promising. In conclusion, the paper cautions that 
no single exchange rate regime is right for all countries or at all times. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime for developing countries has been at the centre of 
the debate for a long time. The choice is essential for monetary policy, the main responsibility of 
central banks. Yet, despite much debate on this subject over a number of decades, many issues remain 
unresolved. A government’s choice of exchange rate has significant consequences for the entire 
economy. The proper exchange rate regime depends on a country’s particular circumstances.  
Over the past two and a half decades, many African countries have been encouraged by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF and World Bank to adopt floating exchange-rate regimes. In 
reality, most countries have implemented a managed or ‘dirty’ float. However, since the ascendancy 
of the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach to development for such countries in the late 1990s, 
issues of exchange-rate regimes, and indeed trade policy more generally, seem to have attracted less 
attention in the policy dialogue between the international financial institutions and governments of 
low-income countries (Ladd, 2003). The implicit assumption seems to be that floats and dirty floats 
are the most appropriate regime, and that extensive intervention by the authorities in exchange-rate 
management represents an inappropriate price distortion.  
The above position is however is in conflict with both findings in empirical literature regarding the 
most appropriate exchange-rate regime for African countries and the reality on the ground in terms of 
the number of countries moving away from floats and back towards pegged regimes. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews exchange rate options available for different 
countries. Section 2.0 reviews literature on the debate on appropriate exchange rate regimes. Section 
3.0 outlines the evolution of exchange-rate regimes in African countries. Section 4.0 examines 
macroeconomic performance under different exchange rate regimes. Section 5.0 discusses the choice 
of appropriate exchange rate regimes for sub-Saharan African countries. Section 6.0 makes 
concluding remarks. 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the choice of exchange rate regime for developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  Specifically, the study attempts to answer the following questions: 
what are the costs and benefits of the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes for sub-Saharan 
African countries. What are the determinants of the choice of an exchange rate regime and how would 
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country circumstances and experiences affect the choice? Does macroeconomic performance differ 
under alternative regimes? 
1.2 Exchange rate regime options 
Exchange-rate regimes range from fixed (hard peg) regimes at one end and floating (fully flexible) 
regimes at the other. Under fixed exchange rate, a country fixes its exchange rate to another currency, 
for instance, the US dollar or a basket of currencies. To maintain the fix, monetary authorities buy or 
sell foreign exchange in order to balance demand and supply in the currency market. To do this 
successfully, the country normally needs foreign-currency reserves equivalent to three months’ worth 
of imports. Under a freely floating exchange-rate regime, the authorities simply allow the exchange 
rate to fluctuate according to market forces, i.e. the demand and supply of foreign and domestic 
currency as determined by foreign trade and international capital flows (Harrigan, 2006) 
In between these two end solutions are a number of intermediate types of regimes. Next to a fixed 
regime is an adjustable peg (a fix which will be adjusted in exceptional circumstances). Then moving 
gradually towards a free float, we have a crawling peg (a fix which is gradually and periodically 
adjusted according to a set of indicators e.g. to accommodate differences between the country’s 
inflation rate and world inflation); then a crawling band (where exchange rate is forced to fluctuate 
inside a narrow band around a fixed central rate that is adjusted periodically to keep it in line with 
fundamentals like inflation differentials); and then a managed float (no commitment to any particular 
exchange rate or pre-announced path but periodic intervention by the authorities at their discretion); 
and a wide-band system (the exchange rate is allowed to float freely within a predetermined broad 
band over time). The closer the intermediate system is to a pure float, the less the need for the 
authorities to intervene and hence the less the need to hold international reserves for this purpose 
(Harrigan, 2006).  
2.0        Literature review on the debate on appropriate exchange-rate regimes 
The standard theory of choosing an exchange rate regime is mainly based on the theory of optimal 
currency areas of Mundell (1961) and Poole (1970). These models of choosing an exchange rate 
regime typically evaluate such regimes by how effective they are in reducing the variance of domestic 
output in an economy with sticky prices.  
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) discuss the standard theory of choice between exchange rate regimes and 
its weaknesses which arise when applied to emerging market economies. They try to establish a 
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relationship between a range of institutional characteristics of a country and choice of its exchange 
rate regimes. They investigate if there is causality between the development of successful fiscal, 
financial and monetary institutions and the country-specific fact that whether a floating or fixed 
exchange rate is preferred. 
Empirical research based upon de facto rather than de jure exchange-rate regime classification 
indicates that for low-income countries (although not for emerging transitional economies), a hard 
peg might be the most suitable regime in terms of achieving low inflation levels without sacrificing 
growth (Husain et al., 2005; Bleany and Fielding, 2002; Ghosh et al., 1997, 2003), whereas floating 
rates induce volatility, which may damage growth (Rogoff, 1999). 
These empirical findings have received support from a number of developments in literature. 
Theoretical literature reveals suggests that, for developing countries, pegs or an exchange rate anchor 
allow policy makers in countries with a high propensity to inflation to import credibility and low 
inflation (Dornbusch, 2001; Edwards, 2001). Alongside these developments in research literature, 
developing countries themselves have been moving towards less flexible exchange rate regimes, with 
an increase in such regimes over the past decade. In particular, a greater number of low-income 
countries have shifted towards less flexible than towards more flexible regimes (Husain et al., 2005: 
42).  
Harrigan (2006) reviews evidence suggesting that for low-income countries with good fiscal 
discipline, it is a fixed rate which is likely to bring the biggest benefits in terms of economic 
performance. The counter-argument that such a regime distorts a key price variable which is an 
important determinant of both exports and imports is not strong in the context of low income 
countries. Econometric work shows that for developing countries, the domestic output levels are 
much more important determinants of exports and imports than the real effective exchange rate.. 
 
In general, empirical literature has not yet developed a strong position on which exchange rate system 
developing countries should adopt. Frankel (1999 and 2004) and Mussa et al (2000) emphasize that 
“no single currency regime is right for all countries or at all times". Nonetheless, Rogoff et al (2003) 
summarize their review of the evidence of the impact of the exchange rate regime on developing 
countries' economic performance thus: "relatively rigid regimes – pegs and intermediate flexibility 
arrangements – appear to have enhanced policy credibility and thus helped achieve lower inflation at 
little apparent cost in terms of lost growth, higher growth volatility, or more frequent crises."  
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Mussa et al (2000) provide a list of factors that would favour a country pegging its rate: (i) low 
capital mobility; (ii) a high share of trade with the country to which it is pegged; (iii) the shocks it 
faces are similar to those facing the country to which it pegs; (iv) it already relies extensively on its 
partners' currency; (v) fiscal policy is flexible and sustainable; (vi) its labour markets are flexible; 
(vii) it has high international reserves. 
In other words, to sustain a pegged rate a developing economy should have the capacity to perform 
well and flexibly, and maintain low inflation. Otherwise it would be advised to adopt a floating 
exchange rate regime, thereby allowing the exchange rate to act as an extra shock absorber. Of 
course, the requirements listed by Mussa et al. (2007) are also those that, together with a strong 
financial system, would enable the country successfully to maintain a flexible exchange rate system. 
Mussa et al (2007) also note that as countries develop and become more financially sophisticated and 
more integrated into global markets, they should consider more flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Proponents of the bipolar view, including Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Eichengreen (1998), 
predict that countries that have integrated, or are integrating, their domestic capital markets with 
global capital markets will be unable to sustain intermediate regimes and will be forced to choose one 
of the two extremes: either a hard fix or a freely floating exchange rate regime. In their opinion, the 
middle ground—made up of adjustable (soft) pegs—will eventually vanish for countries that are open 
to international capital flows. 
Harrigan, J (2006) analysis of exchange rate theories on the effects of exchange rate regimes on 
macro policy, inflation and trade performance suggest that the most appropriate exchange rate regime 
for any given developing country is likely to be contingent on a number of country-specific factors. 
These include the degree of exposure to global capital markets, the maturity of the domestic financial 
sector, the attitude of the authorities towards fiscal and monetary policy discipline, and the price 
elasticities of imports and exports. The implication is that for low-income, small, open economies, 
which have limited exposure to international capital flows, an undeveloped financial sector, a 
tendency towards expansionary fiscal monetary policies and inelasticities in tradable markets, perhaps 
the most appropriate regime is a fixed exchange rate. With regard to international trade and exchange 
rate regime, it is strongly argued that if a country is a price taker in world markets or if its export 
competitiveness is dependent and on non-price factors, depreciation will not have any effect on export 
competitiveness.  
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3.0 Evolution of exchange rate regimes for African countries 
From 1946 to 1973, exchange rate policy was dominated by the Bretton Woods Agreement 
of 1944, with its commitment to currencies convertible for current account transactions and 
fixed exchange rates (beyond a narrow band of permissible flexibility) but adjustable if 
necessary.  
The Bretton Woods arrangement came under strain in the late 1960s, and in March 1973, the practice 
of fixing exchanges was generally abandoned by the major countries of Europe and Japan. Countries 
entered another period of floating exchange rates. Many countries, however, chose to fix their 
currencies to some major currency e.g. the United States dollar.  
The advent of IMF and World Bank Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programmes in the early 
1980s signalled a change in developing countries’ approaches to exchange-rate regimes. For many 
countries with severe balance-of-payments difficulties reflected in sizeable payments arrears, the IMF 
recommended the adoption of floating exchange rates (Quirk et al., 1987).In this respect the Fund was 
influenced by the neoclassical advocacy of floating exchange-rate regimes (Friedman, 1953; Frankel 
and Johnson, 1976). By the 1990s the majority of World Bank and IMF policy packages in 
developing countries addressed the question of exchange-rate management. The World Bank (1994) 
argued that most African countries required a real depreciation to compensate for worsening terms of 
trade in the 1990s, and that countries with flexible exchange rates which, either devalued from time to 
time or had a crawling peg or managed float, could achieve real depreciation quickly. The case for 
floating was comprehensively summarised by Krugman and Obstfeld (1994: 559). 
Table 1 shows the evolution of exchange rate arrangements for selected African countries. This 
classification system is based on members' actual, de facto, arrangements as identified by IMF staff. 
In 2000, out of the 35 countries in the sample, almost half (16 countries) had floating exchange rate 
regimes. This was a marked rise from a mere five in 1995. However, by 2008, the number of floating 
regimes had dropped to 8 while the numbers of countries with pegs had risen to 26 (about three-
quarters the countries).  Thus, during the past decade, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries 
have been moving back towards less flexible exchange rate regimes. In particular, a greater number of 
low-income countries have shifted towards less flexible than towards more flexible regimes. 
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Table 1: Evolution of exchange rate regimes for selected African countries  
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Southern Africa 
Angola 
Botswana 
Malawi 
South Africa 
Lesotho 
Zambia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
East Africa 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Eritrea 
Rwanda 
West Africa 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Togo 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Mali 
Sierra Leone 
Niger 
Guinea Bissau 
Guinea  
Liberia 
Central Africa 
C .African Rep  
Cameroon 
Gabon 
DRC 
Chad 
Equator. Guinea 
Rep. of Congo 
 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
Float 
Fix 
Fix 
N/A 
N/A 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
 
intern 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
N/A 
N/A 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
 
Float 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Interm 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
interim 
Fix 
Interim 
N/A 
N/A 
Fix 
 
Float 
Fix 
Float 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
 
Float 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Interm 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
 
N/A2 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Interim 
N/A 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Interim 
Fix 
N/A 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Interm 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
fix 
Fix 
Interm 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Interm 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Interim3  
Conven. peg 
managed 
float4 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Float 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Interim 
Fix 
Float 
N/A 
Interim 
 
Float 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Interm 
Fix 
Fix 
Float 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
Interim 
Fix 
Fix 
Fix 
 
Float 
Conventional peg 
Managed float 
Float 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
Independent float 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
 
Conventional peg 
Managed float 
Independent float 
Managed float 
Independent float 
Independent float 
 
Managed float 
Independent float 
Currency board5  
Currency board 
Currency board 
Currency board 
Currency board 
Currency board  
Independent float 
Currency board 
Currency board 
Independent float 
Independent float 
 
Conventional peg  
Currency board 
Currency board 
Independent float 
Currency board 
Currency board 
Currency board 
 
Conventional peg6 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
Independent float 
Conventional peg 
Managed float 
Managed float 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
 
Independent float 
Managed float 
Independent float 
Managed float 
Conventional peg 
Managed float 
 
Managed float 
Managed float 
Currency board 
Currency bard 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Currency board 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
Currency board 
Currency board 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
 
Conventional peg  
Conventional peg 
Currency board 
Independent float 
Currency board 
Currency board 
Currency board 
 
Conventional peg 
Crawling peg7 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
Managed float 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
 
Managed float 
Managed float 
Managed float 
Crawling peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
 
Managed float 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Managed float 
 
Conventional peg  
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Independent float 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
Conventional peg 
                                                 
2
 This means not available 
3
 This stands for intermediate regime between fixed and flexible exchange rate 
4
 The monetary authority influences the movement of the exchange rate through active intervention in foreign exchange market without 
specifying, or pre-committing to, a pre-announced path  for the exchange rate 
 
5
 A monetary regime based on explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed 
exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations 
6The country (formally or de facto) pegs its currency at a fixed rate to another currency or a basket of currencies where the exchange rate 
fluctuates within a narrow margin. 
7
 The currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators 
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Source, IMF staff reports (various); C. African rep (Central African Republic); DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), Rep 
of Congo (Republic of Congo), Equator. Guinea (Equatorial Guinea) 
 
4.0 Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance 
Sub-Saharan African countries have enjoyed strong economic performance during the past decade 
(see table2). Between 2002 and 2007, sub-Saharan Africa’s output grew annually by some 6.5 percent 
– the highest in more than thirty years. During the same period, most sub-Saharan African countries 
operated pegged exchange rate regimes. The table also show that output is slightly lower for under 
pegged exchange rate regimes compared to floating regimes. This finding corroborates with Gosh et 
al. (1996) whose study of 136 countries show that floating regimes delivered higher real gross 
domestic product (GDP) compared to fixed regimes. However, this does not necessarily imply 
causality as there might be other economic developments that may have affected economic 
performance during the different periods. In addition, table 2 indicates that variability of output 
growth is higher under pegged regimes. On balance, however, fixed regimes performed better during 
the 2001-2008 period compared to the 1997-2001.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 9 - 
 
 
Table 2: Real Economic growth rate and exchange rate regimes 
Economic indicator 1997-
2001 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real GDP (percent) 
Angola 
Botswana 
Malawi 
South Africa 
Lesotho 
Zambia 
Mozambique 
SADC 
 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Eritrea 
EAC 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Togo 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Mali 
Sierra Leone 
WAEMU 
C.African Rep  
Cameroon 
Gabon 
DRC 
Chad 
Equator. Guinea 
CEMAC 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Fixed  regimes 
Floating regimes 
 
4.8 
6.2 
1.6 
2.5 
1.4 
2.4 
9.2 
2.3 
 
5.5 
1.3 
4.4 
4.5 
N/A 
N/A 
2.7 
4.2 
4.3 
0.8 
5.1 
5.8 
2.0 
5.1 
-0.9 
3.6 
 
3.4 
4.8 
0.1 
-4.1 
3.9 
38.0 
7.3 
3.1 
3.7 
2.9 
 
3.1 
5.2 
-4.1 
2.7 
3.3 
4.9 
13.0 
2.7 
 
4.9 
1.1 
6.2 
7.7 
N/A 
N/A 
3.1 
4.2 
4.7 
0.6 
5.0 
6.7 
0.1 
12.11 
18.1 
4.4 
 
0.3 
5.3 
2.0 
-2.1 
9.9 
40.5 
10.6 
3.8 
4.9 
3.5 
 
14.4 
5.0 
2.1 
3.6 
4.5 
3.3 
7.4 
3.8 
 
3.3 
1.1 
7.2 
1.6 
N/A 
N/A 
1.5 
4.5 
1.1 
4.5 
6.0 
5.2 
-1.5 
4.3 
27.5 
2.1 
 
-0.6 
6.5 
N/A 
3.5 
9.9 
9.6 
6.2 
3.5 
2.6 
3.7 
 
3.4 
6.6 
5.7 
3.1 
3.9 
5.1 
6.5 
3.9 
 
6.5 
2.8 
6.9 
-3.5 
-2.7 
4.6 
10.3 
5.2 
6.7 
5.2 
4.0 
7.3 
-1.7 
7.2 
9.5 
3.8 
 
-7.1 
4.0 
2.4 
5.8 
14.7 
14.0 
5.5 
5.1 
4.7 
5.2 
 
11.2 
6.0 
5.4 
4.9 
4.6 
5.4 
7.9 
5.9 
 
6.8 
4.6 
7.8 
9.8 
1.5 
6.2 
10.6 
5.6 
5.9 
2.4 
3.0 
4.6 
1.6 
1.2 
9.7 
2.8 
 
1.0 
3.7 
1.1 
6.6 
36.6 
38.0 
12.5 
7.2 
7.4 
7.2 
 
20.6 
1.6 
3.3 
5.0 
0.7 
5.3 
8.4 
6.5 
 
6.3 
5.9 
7.4 
12.6 
2.6 
6.4 
5.4 
5.9 
5.5 
1.2 
2.9 
7.1 
1.9 
6.1 
7.1 
4.5 
 
2.4 
2.3 
3.0 
7.9 
7.9 
9.7 
5.1 
6.2 
4.3 
6.6 
 
18.6 
5.1 
6.7 
5.3 
8.1 
6.2 
8.7 
6.9 
 
10.8 
6.4 
6.7 
11.5 
-1.0 
7.5 
6.2 
6.4 
2.4 
3.9 
3.8 
5.5 
0.7 
5.3 
5.1 
3.2 
 
3.8 
3.2 
1.2 
5.6 
0.2 
1.3 
2.5 
6.4 
3.4 
7.1 
 
20.3 
4.4 
8.6 
5.1 
5.1 
6.3 
7.0 
7.2 
 
8.4 
7.1 
7.1 
11.5 
1.3 
7.4 
7.0 
5.7 
4.7 
1.9 
4.6 
3.6 
1.6 
4.3 
6.4 
3.3 
 
3.7 
3.3 
5.6 
6.3 
0.2 
21.4 
5.9 
6.9 
4.6 
7.4 
 
13.2 
2.9 
9.7 
3.1 
3.5 
5.8 
6.8 
5.1 
 
9.0 
1.7 
7.4 
11.6 
1.0 
5.8 
6.0 
7.3 
2.5 
1.1 
5.0 
5.0 
2.3 
5.1 
5.5 
3.9 
 
2.2 
2.9 
2.3 
6.2 
-0.2 
11.3 
4.2 
5.5 
3.9 
5.8 
Source: IMF Staff reports; World Economic Outlook database 
SADC stands for Southern African Development Community; WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union; EAC 
(East African Economic Community), CEMAC (Economic Community of Central African States 
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With regards to exports, fixed exchange rate regimes delivered higher exports compared to floating 
regimes (see table 3). This is in line with findings from Harrigan (2006). Harrigan states that for 
developing countries, which are price takers in world markets, flexible exchange rate depreciations 
will not have any effects on export competiveness. 
Table 3: Exports of goods and services and exchange rate regimes 
 
Economic indicator 1997-
2001 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Exports of goods and 
services (percent of 
GDP) 
Angola 
Botswana 
Malawi 
South Africa 
Lesotho 
Zambia 
Mozambique 
SADC 
 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Eritrea 
EAC 
 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Togo 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Mali 
Sierra Leone 
WAEMU 
 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Gabon 
DRC 
Chad 
Equator. Guinea 
CEMAC 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
75.2 
55.0 
27.2 
26.7 
30.8 
29.0 
18.5 
30.4 
 
11.8 
26.4 
14.5 
15.2 
N/A 
N/A 
 
43.0 
38.5 
30.1 
30.4 
15.9 
9.9 
44.6 
24.2 
15.4 
30.8 
 
27.8 
19.9 
59.3 
22.2 
17.2 
100.1 
43.9 
31.9 
38.4 
30.1 
 
 
76.6 
51.5 
28.0 
29.8 
45.9 
29.0 
29.2 
32.2 
 
12.0 
26.5 
15.2 
15.1 
N/A 
N/A 
 
43.3 
45.2 
30.7 
33.7 
15.0 
9.1 
45.1 
29.0 
16.0 
31.2 
 
31.8 
16.5 
59.1 
18.6 
15.2 
105.7 
48.5 
33.8 
36.7 
33.0 
 
 
77.6 
52.3 
24.3 
32.5 
52.5 
28.6 
33.0 
31.3 
 
12.0 
26.7 
15.2 
16.2 
N/A 
N/A 
 
40.8 
42.5 
30.6 
35.2 
13.8 
9.0 
54.4 
31,9 
16.4 
34.5 
 
27.4 
15.5 
56.0 
21.2 
12.1 
112.9 
45.7 
32.8 
30.1 
33.9 
 
 
69.6 
45.4 
19.7 
28.1 
52.3 
28.6 
30.1 
31.7 
 
11.4 
23.7 
14.7 
14.2 
6.4 
17.6 
 
43.2 
40.7 
26.6 
34.7 
13.7 
8.4 
45.8 
26.0 
23.2 
29.9 
 
24.0 
13.5 
55.1 
26.0 
24.6 
96.8 
44.1 
33.3 
38.4 
32.0 
 
 
69.7 
44.2 
20.6 
26.7 
60.0 
37.7 
32.2 
31.7 
 
12.5 
26.9 
18.0 
14.9 
5.8 
20.2 
 
44.5 
39.3 
27.1 
37.2 
14.3 
10.9 
48.6 
24.3 
22.5 
31.3 
 
22.7 
13.8 
62.2 
30.1 
51.4 
90.1 
48.1 
34.2 
41.0 
32.5 
 
 
79.3 
51.4 
20.4 
27.4 
51.1 
34.5 
33.2 
34.0 
 
13.1 
28.4 
19.7 
15.1 
6.2 
21.5 
 
45.8 
36.4 
27.0 
36.9 
12.9 
9.9 
51.1 
24.5 
23.6 
31.6 
 
24.5 
12.8 
64.7 
33.3 
55.5 
87.4 
54.2 
36.6 
44.1 
34.8 
 
 
73.8 
47.0 
19.1 
29.7 
50.0 
37.5 
40.6 
36.8 
 
15.5 
25.9 
21.7 
13.9 
6.9 
21.6 
 
41.0 
40.2 
25.6 
24.7 
11.4 
11.5 
52.7 
30.0 
24.9 
31.9 
 
28.1 
14.2 
61.9 
37.7 
56.4 
86.8 
56.4 
37.6 
45.3 
35.9 
 
 
75.4 
47.6 
22.2 
31.5 
52.7 
41.9 
37.8 
39.7 
 
16.9 
26.1 
21.2 
12.7 
5.8 
21.8 
 
41.0 
40.0 
25.5 
26.3 
16.2 
10.6 
47.8 
26.6 
20.8 
30.1 
 
33.1 
14.1 
62.2 
65.3 
54.8 
81.9 
57.0 
38.9 
44.7 
37.6 
 
 
75.6 
43.5 
22.5 
35.4 
46.8 
35.9 
34.1 
43.3 
 
21.7 
27.8 
20.2 
11.6 
5.0 
23.2 
 
41.6 
42.5 
24.9 
23.5 
15.3 
9.3 
46.5 
25.0 
15.8 
29.0 
 
33.4 
10.8 
66.6 
61.1 
54.1 
78.3 
58.1 
41.0 
44.6 
40.2 
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Source: IMF Staff reports; World Economic Outlook database; GDP (gross domestic product) 
Table 4 shows that inflation was on average significantly higher among countries with flexible 
exchange rates than among countries with fixed exchange rates.  This suggests that there is inflation 
cost to floating the exchange rate. This finding is in line with Gosh et al (1996) who show that that 
pegs and other limited flexibility regimes lower average inflation rates than managed and free floats.  
 
Table 4: Inflation and exchange rate regimes 
Economic indicator 1997-2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Consumer prices (annual 
average percent change) 
Angola 
Botswana 
Malawi 
South Africa 
Lesotho 
Zambia 
Mozambique 
SADC 
 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Eritrea 
EAC 
 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Togo 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Mali 
Sierra Leone 
WAEMU 
C.African Rep  
Cameroon 
Gabon 
DRC 
Chad 
Equator. Guinea 
CEMAC 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Fixed  regimes 
Floating regimes 
 
 
211.2 
7.7 
28.1 
6.4 
7.6 
24.7 
6.3 
21.0 
 
2.9 
8.0 
9.8 
0.6 
N/A 
N/A 
 
10.0 
22.6 
1.5 
2.4 
3.4 
2.2 
3.3 
1.3 
17.3 
2.6 
1.1 
2.9 
1.6 
284.1 
3.5 
5.6 
3.9 
14.6 
9.8 
15.8 
 
 
152.6 
6.6 
27.2 
5.7 
6.9 
21.7 
9.0 
12.5 
 
-2.0 
5.8 
5.2 
-5.2 
N/A 
N/A 
 
18.0 
32.9 
3.0 
3.9 
4.0 
4.9 
4.4 
5.2 
2.6 
4.2 
3.8 
2.8 
2.1 
357.1 
12.4 
7.3 
4.5 
15.7 
13.4 
16.3 
 
 
108.9 
8.1 
14.9 
9.2 
11.2 
22.2 
16.8 
17.7 
 
5.0 
2.0 
4.6 
-7.2 
N/A 
N/A 
 
13.7 
14.8 
2.3 
3.1 
2.4 
2.3 
3.1 
2.4 
-3.7 
2.7 
2.3 
6.3 
0.2 
25.3 
5.2 
5.9 
4.9 
12.5 
16.7 
11.5 
 
 
98.3 
9.2 
9.6 
5.8 
7.3 
21.4 
13.5 
12.3 
 
5.7 
9.8 
4.4 
151 
22.7 
7.1 
 
14.0 
26.7 
0.0 
-0.9 
1.5 
2.0 
3.3 
-1.2 
7.5 
1.1 
4.4 
0.6 
2.1 
12.8 
-1.8 
7.3 
1.6 
10.9 
2.5 
13.0 
 
 
43.6 
7.0 
11.4 
1.4 
5.0 
18.0 
12.6 
6.3 
 
5.0 
11.6 
4.1 
8.6 
25.1 
7.7 
 
15.0 
12.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.9 
-0.4 
1.5 
-3.1 
14.2 
0.3 
-2.2 
0.3 
0.4 
4.0 
-4.8 
4.2 
0.4 
7.6 
1.2 
9.2 
 
 
23.0 
8.6 
15.5 
3.4 
3.4 
18.3 
6.4 
6.8 
 
8.0 
10.3 
4.4 
6.8 
12.5 
7.8 
 
17.9 
15.1 
1.7 
6.8 
5.4 
6.4 
3.9 
6.4 
12.1 
4.7 
2.9 
2.0 
1.2 
21.4 
3.7 
5.7 
2.7 
8.9 
4.1 
10.1 
 
 
13.3 
11.6 
13.9 
4.7 
6.1 
9.0 
13.2 
6.8 
 
6.6 
14.5 
7.3 
12.3 
15.1 
9.8 
 
8.2 
10.2 
2.1 
2.2 
3.8 
2.4 
2.5 
1.5 
9.5 
2.2 
6.7 
4.9 
-1.4 
13.2 
7.7 
4.5 
4.1 
7.3 
4.0 
8.0 
 
 
12.2 
7.1 
7.9 
7.1 
8.0 
10.7 
8.2 
8.2 
 
6.8 
9.8 
7.0 
15.8 
9.3 
8.2 
 
5.4 
10.7 
5.9 
1.0 
1.3 
-0.2 
1.9 
1.5 
11.7 
2.0 
0.9 
1.1 
5.0 
16.7 
-7.4 
2.8 
1.0 
7.1 
2.5 
8.1 
 
 
12.5 
12.6 
8.7 
11.5 
10.7 
12.4 
10.3 
11.6 
 
7.3 
13.1 
10.3 
25.3 
12.6 
11.2 
 
11.6 
16.5 
5.8 
8.4 
8.0 
10.7 
6.3 
9.1 
14.8 
7.9 
9.3 
5.3 
5.3 
18.0 
8.3 
5.9 
6.0 
11.6 
7.8 
12.4 
Source: IMF Staff reports; World Economic Outlook database 
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This finding is also in agreement with other studies, Gosh et al (2003), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003) who found that hard pegs have the lowest inflation than more flexible regimes, and that in 
developing countries, exchange rate flexibility is associated with significantly higher inflation 
(Husain et al, 2005) 
5.0 Choosing appropriate regime for African countries 
The conclusion drawn from empirical  literature is that the most appropriate exchange rate regime for 
any given developing economy is likely to depend on its degree of exposure to international capital 
and the level to which its domestic financial sector has matured, (Harrigan, 2006; Williamson, 2000). 
For countries that are heavily exposed to international capital flows, with fairly mature and well 
regulated domestic financial sector, a float may be the most appropriate regime and vice versa.  
The strong argument in favour of floating exchange rate regime is that it prevents distortions of the 
key price – that of foreign currency and ensures competitiveness in international trade. The exchange 
rate is free to respond to changes in demand and supply of foreign and domestic currency, changes 
that reflect the underlying trends in balance of payments. It plays the role of equilibrating demand and 
supply, which can not be performed by the fixed exchange rate. However, the ability of the exchange 
rate to play this equilibrating role in developing countries depends on a number of other factors and 
often unrealistic assumptions – such as price flexibility and elasticity of both import demand and 
export supply with respect to prices 
 
As already indicated, if a country is a price taker on the international markets, like most developing 
countries in Africa, or if its export competitiveness is dependent on non-price factors – such as 
quality, branding and reliability, a depreciation of the exchange rate will not have any effect on the 
competitiveness of exports. Additionally, if a country is highly import-dependent and if imports take 
the form of intermediate and capital goods then import demand may not respond to changes in the 
exchange rate, i.e. it will be price-inelastic. Furthermore, for developing countries under balance-of 
payments growth constraint (shortage of foreign exchange), imports are more likely to be determined 
by the availability of foreign exchange (determined by aid and exports), with the exchange rate 
playing only a minor role. All of the above characteristics tend to apply to small open low-income 
economies, and much of the empirical work suggests that in such countries changes in the exchange 
rate, as under a free float, have little impact on imports and exports. With such a scenario, the most 
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appropriate exchange rate regime is the one leaning towards a fixed regime. It brings advantages in 
terms of lower inflation rates and higher growth rates particularly to low-income countries.  Thus a 
return to a peg may well offer the best option for such countries. 
6.0 Conclusion and the way forward 
In analysing the choice of exchange rate regimes for developing countries in sub-Saharan African 
countries, it is necessary to distinguish between those countries with substantial involvement in 
international financial markets and those where involvement is limited. Though the current thinking, 
especially among international financial institutions is that market determined exchange rates are the 
most appropriate for developing countries, recent empirical work and evidence, using de facto 
classifications of the exchange rate regime suggest that fixed regimes may be more appropriate for 
low-income countries. 
 
For the majority of sub-Saharan African countries, with less linkage to global capital markets, 
traditional exchange rate pegs and intermediate regimes are more viable and retain important 
advantages. Other factors aside, evidence shows that most low-income countries have performed well 
during peg regimes. The counter-argument that an exchange rate fix, by distorting prices acts as a 
disincentive to exporters does not hold at least for low-income African countries as empirical work 
concludes that the real effective exchange rate is not a key determinant of either export supply or 
import demand – non price factors are more important. 
 
For middle-income African economies, with relatively developed financial markets and linkages to 
modern global capital markets, floating arrangements, including the managed floating exchange rate 
regime, look more promising. If supported by the required policy discipline and institutional 
structures, however, hard currency pegs may also be appropriate for some of these countries. The 
general presumption then is that as countries become more developed; they should be moving away 
from intermediate regimes, towards greater flexibility of the exchange rate – or a hard peg in cases of 
a monetary union or currency board. 
 
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that no single exchange rate regime is right for all countries or 
at all times, and no regime can act as an alternative for good policies and strong institutions. The 
exchange rate regime should be looked at as part of a monetary policy framework, which itself is an 
essential part of a sound macroeconomic framework.  
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